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When we do not know how to correctly behave in a new context, the emotions that
people familiar with the context show in response to the behaviors of others, can
help us understand what to do or not to do. The present study examined cross-
cultural differences in how group emotional expressions (anger, sadness, neutral) can
be used to deduce a norm violation in four cultures (Germany, Israel, Greece, and the
US), which differ in terms of decoding rules for negative emotions. As expected, in
all four countries, anger was a stronger norm violation signal than sadness or neutral
expressions. However, angry and sad expressions were perceived as more intense and
the relevant norm was learned better in Germany and Israel than in Greece and the US.
Participants in Greece were relatively better at using sadness as a sign of a likely norm
violation. The results demonstrate both cultural universality and cultural differences in the
use of group emotion expressions in norm learning. In terms of cultural differences they
underscore that the social signal value of emotional expressions may vary with culture
as a function of cultural differences, both in emotion perception, and as a function of a
differential use of emotions.
Keywords: emotion expressions, social signals, normative behavior
Introduction
Imagine that you watch a group of people. They are taking turns doing a task and when suddenly
one person does the task diﬀerently, the others look angry. What would you conclude? In a study
using such a scenario, participants concluded that if someone wanted to be part of the group, they
should do the task like the previous members of the group did it, not like the last member (Hareli
et al., 2013). Yet, when the others reacted with sadness, participants were less sure what the proper
behavior should be. Thus, the emotions shown by onlookers are one signal people can use to learn
how to behave in a new social context.
Emotion Expressions as Social Signals of Norm Violation
Hareli et al. (2013) focused on anger as a strong signal toward the normativeness of a behavior.
The authors grounded their argument on appraisal theory (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1987).
Speciﬁcally, according to appraisal theories of emotion, emotions are elicited and diﬀerentiated
through a series of appraisals of (internal or external) stimulus events based on the perceived nature
of the event (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1987). Negative emotions such as sadness, anger, and fear
are characterized by appraisals of goal obstruction/unpleasantness. That is, these emotions occur
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when something undesirable happened. For anger, one additional
relevant appraisal relates to whether the event is congruent with
prevalent norms. As observers can reconstruct appraisals as they
apply to a situation (Robinson and Clore, 2002), they can “reverse
engineer” or reconstruct the relationship between the person and
the event based on the emotion expressed (Frijda, 1986; Weiner,
2006; Hareli and Hess, 2010, 2012). That is, a person who sees
an angry other will know that this person encountered an event
that was not only undesirable but speciﬁcally incongruent with
the person’s norms – even if the observer does not know anything
else about the emoter and the situation within which the emotion
occurred (Hareli and Hess, 2010).
In fact, any event that is appraised as obstructing a
person’s goals or as undesirable might be indicative of a
problem with the actor’s behavior as well (Scherer, 1987,
1999; Roseman et al., 1990). However, these appraisals simply
reﬂect that something undesirable happened without pointing
to norm violations in particular (Scherer, 2001). Thus, these
appraisals are a more indirect and less speciﬁc sign of non-
normative behavior. Consequently, sadness, which signals goal
obstruction/unpleasantness but not norm violation, should be
less informative regarding norms.
It should be noted that observers are able to deduce a group’s
norm just by witnessing uniform behavior by its members (see
also, Milgram et al., 1969). Thus, the simple fact that one behavior
occurred more often than the other can be indicative of a norm.
But even though the uniformity of the behavior as such is a
suﬃcient cue to the norm, it is frequently not used as such (Miller
and Prentice, 1996).
The goal of the present study was to assess whether the
social signal value of anger generalizes across cultures. Diﬀerent
scenarios are possible, leading to diﬀerent alternate hypotheses.
First, anger is always a potent social signal of social norm
violation, sadness a less potent one, and statistical information
even less as found by Hareli et al. (2013). That is, no cultural
diﬀerences will be found. Second, in cultures in which the
expression of anger is endorsed to a lesser degree, anger should
be a less potent signal of norm violation and this eﬀect should
be directly mediated by the perception of anger, yet, sadness
should still remain a less potent signal compared to anger. Third,
in cultures in which the social meaning of anger is diﬀerent,
anger should be a less potent signal of norm violation with a
potential shift in the relative ability of sadness and statistical
information to signal norm violations. The rationale for these
potential alternative hypotheses is detailed in what follows.
Cross-cultural Differences in Emotion
Perception
The use of bystanders’ emotional reaction to an event to deduce
social norms depends essentially on whether these emotional
reactions are in fact noticed and decoded. Speciﬁcally, if anger
serves as a social cue to norm violation, then the perception
that a norm violation occurred and the learning of the correct
norm should be directly mediated by the degree to which anger is
perceived.
Research on cultural diﬀerences in the decoding of emotions
generally concludes that so-called basic emotions, which include
both anger and sadness, are indeed recognized across cultures
at above chance levels (Elfenbein and Ambady, 2002; Hess and
Thibault, 2009). Yet, these ﬁndings refer to highly prototypical
intense facial expressions shown without context and even
for these facial emotion expressions, diﬀerences in decoding
accuracy across countries have been observed (Elfenbein and
Ambady, 2002). As everyday emotions are typically more subtle
and non-prototypical (Motley and Camden, 1988; Ekman,
2003) and occur within a context (Hess and Hareli, 2014)
diﬀerences in decoding accuracy are very likely. For the
decoding of such more subtle expressions, decoders take
recourse to stereotype knowledge and socio-cultural norms
regarding the “proper” display of emotion expressions when
trying to understand these expressions (Kirouac and Hess,
1999).
In fact, there are strong cultural diﬀerences in emotional
display rules (Matsumoto et al., 2008), that is, the social rules that
guide the appropriate display of emotion expressions (Ekman
and Friesen, 1971). These diﬀerences can in part be related
to diﬀerences in cultural values such as individualism and
collectivism (Matsumoto et al., 2008) but also openness to
change (Koopmann-Holm and Matsumoto, 2011) or masculinity
(Sarid, 2015) among others. In fact, even though cultural values
underpin the establishment of display rules within a culture, it
is unlikely that they depend crucially on a single dimension but
rather one would expect them to be embedded into a richer
cultural fabric. Importantly in this context, social display rules
have a converse side in social decoding rules (Buck, 1984; Hess,
2001), such that perceivers tend to be less good at decoding
expressions that are proscribed in a given culture. Thus, cultures
that diﬀer in anger display rules can also be expected to diﬀer in
anger perception.
The present study replicates the study by Hareli et al.
(2013) in Germany, Greece, the US, and Israel. These cultures
were chosen because they diﬀer with regard to the cultural
endorsement of anger. Diﬀerent underlying social values and
motives seem to explain diﬀerences in anger display rules
between the US and Greece on the one hand and Germany
and Israel on the other. In comparison to other individualistic
cultures, European Americans in the US tend to avoid negative
aﬀect (Koopmann-Holm and Tsai, 2014), which may explain
their lower endorsement of anger expressions in comparison
to Germans in particular (Koopmann-Holm and Matsumoto,
2011). Therefore, the motivation to shy away from negative
aﬀect can be the result of more individualistic concerns to
distance from others. On the other hand, Greek participants with
higher interdependence tend to show lower attention to negative
emotions, including anger expressions, due to collectivism
concerns and the keeping of harmony rules (Kafetsios and Hess,
2013).
There are no studies that compare all four countries, but a
number of studies exist that allow us to triangulate the likely
diﬀerences across all four. In a recent study, Hess et al. (in
press) found that Greek participants rated spontaneous facial
expressions of anger less accurately and less intensely than did
German participants. Germans also endorsed anger (as well as
sadness) expressions more than US Americans, a ﬁnding that the
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authors relate to diﬀerences in openness to change (Koopmann-
Holm and Matsumoto, 2011). In turn, the expression of anger is
endorsed to a larger degree in Israel than in the US, a diﬀerence
that has been explained by diﬀerences in power distance (Margalit
and Mauger, 1984; Grandey et al., 2010). Based on these data, we
predicted that anger expressions would be rated more intensely
in Germany and Israel, followed by the US and Greece.
With regard to sadness ratings, unlike the US, Germany,
and Israel, Greece is a more interdependent country in which
the expression of anger is endorsed less and sadness is valued
relatively more and also recognized better than in Germany (Hess
et al., in press). Also, Greece is higher in uncertainty avoidance,
which has been linked to better sadness decoding (Schimmack,
1996). Thus, sadness should be rated more intensely in Greece
than in the other three countries and more intensely in Germany
than the US.
Consequently, we hypothesized anger to be a strong social
signal of norm violation in Germany and Israel but less so in
the US and least in Greece. Speciﬁcally, as there is evidence
that anger is diﬀerentially endorsed and perceived in the four
diﬀerent cultures (H1) we expected that, in line with the second
alternative above, in cultures in which the expression of anger is
endorsed to a lesser degree, anger should be a less potent signal
of norm violation and this eﬀect should be directly mediated by
the perception of anger (H2). By contrast, sadness should be a
still less potent signal compared to anger. However, as there is
some evidence that negative emotions in a relational context have
diﬀerent meanings for German and Greek participants (Kafetsios
et al., under review), it may be that in this culture sadness will be
a relatively more potent signal of norm violation (H3).
Further, we predicted that the potency of cultural display rules
as decoding rules depends on the perspective of the observer.
Speciﬁcally, it may make a diﬀerence whether a situation is
supposed to be evaluated from a certain social distance as it
relates to other people, or if it is to be evaluated from a ﬁrst person
point of view making it directly relevant to the observer (Ham
and van den Bos, 2008). Thus, we expected stronger eﬀects when
the situation is to be evaluated from a ﬁrst person point of view
making it directly relevant to the observer (H4).
Overview
Following the design of Hareli et al. (2013), participants were
presented with a series of slides that depicted a group of people.
In all slides one of the group members was shown drinking tea
while the others looked on. The ﬁrst two slides each showed
a diﬀerent group member holding the teacup in a speciﬁc way
and the onlookers showed a neutral expression. In the third slide
the teacup was held diﬀerently and the onlookers either reacted
with anger, sadness, or neutrality. The expressions were carefully
created to be of medium intensity only. Participants were then
asked to: (a) describe the norm in their own words, (b) rate how
likely they thought it to be that a norm violation had occurred
and (c) rate the emotions shown by the onlookers in the last slide.
As mentioned above, statistical information on the relative
frequency of the two behaviors alone can be indicative of the
presence of a norm. Yet, as Miller and Prentice (1996) put it,
“norm-congruent behaviors are both unremarkable and unlikely
to be remarked on” (p. 808). Hence the cup was either held ﬁrst
with one hand in the way commonly done in all four cultures, or
with two hands, which should be more salient, as this represents
a cultural (but not group) norm violation. We therefore expected
statistical information to be more informative when the group
norm was to hold the teacup with both hands. Hareli et al.
(2013) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in norm learning as
a function of hand position, but the data did show a diﬀerence
in means congruent with such a possibility. Finally, we varied the
personal relevance of the norm by asking participants to adopt
either a ﬁrst or a third person perspective when being asked about
the norm. A ﬁrst person perspective should make the question
more personally relevant (Ham and van den Bos, 2008), which
should increase motivation and attention. This resulted in a 4
(country) × 3 (last picture emotion expression) × 2 (normative




A total of 149 (84 men, 56%) individuals with a mean age
of 32 years (SD = 8) participated in a laboratory setting at
the University of Haifa (Israel). Further, 273 (120 men, 44%)
individuals with a mean age of 23 years (SD = 7) were recruited
for an online study using a database of current and former
students at the University of Crete (Greece); 261 (84 men, 32%)
individuals with a mean age of 26 years (SD = 5) were recruited
for an online study via the Facebook page of the department of
psychology at Humboldt-University, Berlin (Germany), and 452
(247 men, 56%) with a mean age of 33 years (SD = 11) were
recruited via Amazon Mturk in the US and completed the study.
Procedure
In Haifa, participants came to the laboratory in groups of up
to ﬁve. They were greeted, informed consent was obtained and
they then completed the same computer task as was used in the
online studies. For the online studies, participants received the
same information and consented by clicking a button1.
The ﬁrst screen explained that the study was about social
perception and that participants would see three photos that
documented part of an event. The next slide described the event.
Participants were told that recently four members of a group that
belonged to a social order, which is concerned with charitable
work, had a meeting. The organization was further described
as having an old tradition that includes diﬀerent ceremonies.
Participants had to pretend that they were invited to participate
in a traditional tea drinking ceremony by that group. During the
ceremony, one after the other, each member has to drink tea from
1In previous research we found no diﬀerences between emotion ratings eﬀectuated
in a laboratory setting and those using the web-based version for the same ratings
once appropriate checks on diligence were done. For theMTurk sample, a question
regarding the understanding of the instructions and a control item (if you read this,
please move the slider to the left) were included to detect automated answers. For
all studies, questionnaires that did not include an answer to the open question were
considered as incomplete and discarded.
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his or her cup. Participants were then told that they would see
three photos showing the actions of three groupmembers and the
other members’ reaction to these actions. They were further told
that the photos are presented in the order in which the actions
occurred. Participants were warned that the photos would appear
for a brief time only and that they would be asked to describe
afterward how either someone else who is the next to participate
would behave or how they themselves would behave if they were
next to participate. The three photos were then presented for 8 s
each.
Stimulus Material
The stimulus slides were taken from Hareli et al. (2013) and
adapted by removing Hebrew writing visible in the slides. The
slides showed one of three group members drinking the tea
and the others watching and reacting to this behavior. The ﬁrst
two slides each showed a diﬀerent group member holding the
teacup close to the mouth with both hands and the arms raised
away from the body. The third group member was shown as
holding the teacup only with the right hand. Non drinking
group members were always shown looking at the acting person
while expressing emotional neutrality when the member held
the teacup with two hands (for an example of the stimulus
material, see Figure 1). In a second condition, the norm was
to drink the tea one handed and the norm violation was two
handed drinking. Depending on the experimental condition,
group members expressed anger, sadness, or emotional neutrality
to the non-normative behavior of the last group member.
FIGURE 1 | Example stimulus.
Dependent Measures
Following the last photo, participants were requested to answer
an open question asking them to report either (a) how the
participants would expect an acquaintance who wants to behave
according to the “group spirit” would act (the original question
asked by Hareli et al., 2013) or (b) how they themselves would act
if they wanted to behave according to the “group spirit.”
Participants’ responses to the open question were classiﬁed
into two categories by two raters. Rare inconsistencies were
resolved by discussion. One category included answers that
reﬂected a clear understanding of the norm, such as, “S/he will
drink the tea holding the cup with two hands.” The other category
included answers that reﬂected that the participants did not
understand the norm, such as, “S/he will sit and look and even
drink tea.”
Once they had completed their answer, participants were
referred to the last photo and asked to rate to what extent
the group members had expressed sadness or anger or seemed
indiﬀerent. Finally, participants were asked to rate in two separate
questions the extent to which group members saw the behavior of
the person holding the cup as violating conventions and to what
extent they saw it as violating social laws or norms. As these two
questions correlated substantially (rGreece = 0.75, rGermany = 0.88,
rIsarel = 0.89, and rUSA = 0.90) they were combined into one
variable named norm violation. These ratings were made on
seven-point scales anchored at the extremes, ranging from (0)
“not at all” to (6) “very much.”
Results and Discussion
Because the samples diﬀered with regard to mean age and gender
composition, these variables were initially included as covariates
in the analyses below. Gender was never signiﬁcant and age
only for ratings of anger (and global intensity which includes
anger), such that older individuals rated the expressions as less
angry (angry expressions: r = −0.14, p = 0.007; sad expressions:
r = −0.17, p = 0.001, neutral expressions: r = −0.11, p = 0.031).
None of the ANOVA results changed when the covariates were
included and for the mediation analyses the inclusion of the
covariates strengthened the eﬀect of anger.
Emotion Perception
Overall Intensity
As we predicted that participants from the four cultures should
vary in their ratings of anger (H1) we ﬁrst assessed whether
there were overall diﬀerences in the intensity ratings of the
emotions expressed. Such diﬀerences could be due to culture-
speciﬁc response styles and hence not speciﬁcally related to
anger. For this, we summed the emotion ratings across all three
scales and conducted a one-way ANOVA with culture as a
factor. A signiﬁcant eﬀect of culture emerged, F(3,1141) = 2.87,
p = 0.036, η2p = 0.01, which, however, explained only about
one percent of the variance. The overall perceived intensity was
highest for Israel (M = 6.95, SD = 2.52), followed by Germany
(M = 6.84, SD = 2.92), the US (M = 6.53, SD = 3.24), and
ﬁnally Greece (M = 6.19, SD = 3.15). A post hoc test revealed
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that Greece diﬀered from Israel and Germany, which did not
diﬀer from each other. Including age as a covariate, a slightly
stronger country eﬀect emerged, F(3,1125) = 3.82, p = 0.010,
η2p = 0.01, and the ratings for the US and Greece diﬀered as
well. In all, any diﬀerences in perceived anger intensity between
Germany, Israel, and the US were not due to an overall trend to
rate expressions less intensely. However, this could be the case for
Greece, even though the overall diﬀerence between Greece and
the other countries is rather small.
Is Anger Perceived Differently as a Function of
Country?
To assess our prediction that participants from the four cultures
should vary in their ratings of anger (H1) we conducted an
analysis of variance with a 4 (country) × 3 (emotion expressions
in the last picture: Anger, Sad, Neutral) between-subjects design
on the anger ratings with age as a covariate, F(2,1119) = 6.82,
p= 0.009, η2p = 0.01 (for means and standard errors see Figure 2).
In line with the notion of the universality of emotion expression
perception, a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of last picture expression,
F(2,1119) = 122.81, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18, emerged such that
across countries, anger expressions were rated as signiﬁcantly
more angry than sadness expressions, which were rated as
signiﬁcantly more angry than neutral expressions. The signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of country, F(3,1119) = 14.96, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04,
was qualiﬁed by a country × last picture expression interaction,
F(6,1119) = 4.77, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.03. Speciﬁcally, as predicted,
post hoc tests revealed that anger expressions were rated as more
intensely angry in Germany and Israel, which did not diﬀer, than
in Greece and the US, which also did not diﬀer (H1).
Post hoc comparisons showed that expressions of sadness were
rated as most intensely angry in Germany, followed by Greece,
which diﬀered only marginally (p = 0.066) from Germany and
Israel (p = 0.071). Sadness expressions were rated as signiﬁcantly
less angry in both Israel and the US, which did not diﬀer. Neutral
expressions were rated as least angry in the US compared to
Germany, Greece and Israel, which did not diﬀer. The ratings in
Germany did not diﬀer from any other country.
In sum, as expected, anger was rated diﬀerently as a function of
culture (H1) and whether anger was the focal emotion expression.
Interestingly, German participants tended to perceive more anger
in all three types of expressions. By contrast, participants from
the US perceived generally less anger in all three expressions.
Greek participants perceived less anger in angry expressions but
relatively more anger in the non-angry expressions, suggesting
that they perceive emotions as more mixed.
Are There Differences in the Perception of
Sadness and Neutrality?
Sadness Intensity
To assess whether the four countries also diﬀered with regard
to their perception of sadness, a 4 (country) × 3 (emotion
expressions in the last picture: Anger, Sad, Neutral) analysis
of variance was conducted (for means and standard errors see
Figure 3). Signiﬁcant main eﬀects of country, F(3,1133) = 3.63,
p= 0.013, η2p = 0.01, and last picture emotion, F(2,1133)= 17.63,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.03, emerged such that, again in line with
the notion of the universality of emotion perception, sadness
expressions were rated as more sad than anger expressions and
neutral expressions, which did not diﬀer. Across expressions
post hoc comparisons showed that Israeli and Greek participants,
who did not diﬀer, perceived more sadness than German and
US participants, who also did not diﬀer. The ﬁnding for Greek
participants is congruent with the notion that individuals from
countries high in uncertainty avoidance are more accurate in
the perception of sadness (Schimmack, 1996), as Greece (100)
is highest on this norm. Even though Israel (81) is lower in
uncertainty avoidance than Greece it is still considerably higher
than Germany (65) and the US (46, numbers refer to Hofstede,
2015), and this may explain the ﬁnding for Israel.
FIGURE 2 | Anger ratings as a function of emotion expression and country.
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FIGURE 3 | Sadness ratings as a function of emotion expression and country.
Indifference Ratings
To assess whether the four countries also diﬀered with regard
to their perception of indiﬀerence, a 4 (country) × 3 (emotion
expressions in the last picture: Anger, Sad, Neutral) analysis
of variance was conducted (for means and standard errors
see Figure 4). Signiﬁcant main eﬀects of last picture emotion
emerged, F(2,1133) = 68.87, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11, such that
neutral expressions were rated as expressing most indiﬀerence,
followed by sadness and anger expressions, which were rated as
least indiﬀerent. The main eﬀect of country, F(3,1133) = 27.70,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07, was qualiﬁed by a last picture
emotion × country interaction, F(6,1133) = 4.64, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.02, such that angry expressions were perceived as most
indiﬀerent in the US compared to Greece, Israel, and Germany,
which did not diﬀer. Post hoc comparisons showed that sadness
expressions were also rated as most indiﬀerent by participants
from the US as well as least indiﬀerent by Greek participants,
with Israeli (M = 2.29, SE = 0.25) and German participants
at intermediate levels. Finally, neutral expressions were rated
as least indiﬀerent by Greek participants compared to German,
Israeli, and US participants, which did not diﬀer.
Thus overall, participants from the US rated all expressions
as indicating relatively high levels of indiﬀerence, which matches
their lower ratings of anger and sadness across expressions.
FIGURE 4 | Indifference ratings as a function of emotion expression and country.
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By contrast, Greek participants rated expressions generally as
showing less indiﬀerence, however, they tended to see relatively
higher levels of sadness throughout. German participants rated
in particular anger expressions as low in indiﬀerence, which
matches their higher ratings of anger. Overall, Israeli participants
tended to be most accurate in their perception.
Are There Differences in Norm Learning?
An open question assessed whether participants had
spontaneously learned the tea drinking norm. Importantly,
they were only asked how they or another person would act
without any verbal hint toward a possible norm transgression.
The 0 (inaccurate) −1 (accurate) codes were analyzed using a 4
(country) × 3 (emotion expressions in the last picture: Anger,
Sad, Neutral) × 2 (normative hand position: ﬁrst vs. second
hands) × 2 (perspective: ﬁrst vs. third person) between-subjects
design.
Signiﬁcant main eﬀects of country, F(3,1078) = 26.22,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07, emotion, F(2,1078) = 15.29, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.03, and normative hand position, F(1,1078) = 46.15,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04, were qualiﬁed by emotion by normative
hand position, F(2,1078) = 6.32, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.01, and
emotion by country, F(6,1078) = 2.44, p = 0.024, η2p = 0.01,
interactions, respectively. Overall, post hoc comparisons showed
that participants from Germany were most accurate (M = 0.48,
SE = 0.03), and participants from Greece were least accurate
(M = 0.15, SE = 0.04), with Israel (M = 0.30, SE = 0.04) and the
US (M = 0.29, SE = 0.02), which did not diﬀer, at intermediate
levels (for means and standard errors see Figure 5).
Are There Differences in the Appraisal of Norm
Violation?
We further assessed whether participants – even if they may
not be accurate in reporting the actual norm – did nonetheless
realize that a norm violation occurred. For this, we conducted a
4 (country) × 3 (emotion expressions in the last picture: Anger,
Sad, Neutral) × 2 (normative hand position: ﬁrst vs. second
hands)× 2 (perspective: ﬁrst vs. third person) analysis of variance
on the appraisal of norm violation.
A signiﬁcant main eﬀect of emotion expression,
F(3,1097) = 56.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.09, emerged such that,
overall and as expected, participants considered a norm violation
to be most likely when the group had shown anger (M = 3.82,
SE= 0.11), followed by sadness (M = 3.17, SE= 0.11), and ﬁnally
neutrality (M = 2.24, SE = 0.10). This eﬀect was qualiﬁed by an
emotion expression by country interaction, F(6,1097) = 3.19,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.02, such that this pattern emerged signiﬁcantly
for Germany, Israel and the US, whereas for Greece ratings for
sadness and anger did not diﬀer (see Figure 6).
Across countries the likelihood that a norm violation occurred
also diﬀered. A signiﬁcant main eﬀect of country emerged,
F(3,1097) = 11.70, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.03, such that this likelihood
was considered lowest in the US (M = 2.57, SE= 0.09), compared
to Germany (M = 3.13, SE = 0.12), Greece (M = 3.26, SE = 0.11
and Israel (M = 3.35, SE = 0.15), which did not diﬀer in the
post hoc comparisons. Thus, even though Greek participants were
especially inaccurate in learning the norm, they were still aware
of a norm violation. Notably though, for Greek participants both
sadness and anger were equally good signals of norm violation.
This ﬁnding and the ﬁnding that norm learning did not diﬀer
between anger and sadness conditions in the Greek sample
support Hypothesis 3. This may point to the possibility that
negative emotions have a diﬀerent meaning in relational contexts
in an interdependent country as suggested by Kafetsios et al.
(under review). Greek participants were also, together with Israel,
better at concluding that a norm violation had occurred based on
statistical information only.
Are Differences in Norm Learning and Norm
Violation Appraisal Mediated by Emotion
Perception?
Hareli et al. (2013) found that participants were better at
deducing the norm when the group showed anger in response
FIGURE 5 | Norm learning as a function of country and emotion expression in the last picture.
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FIGURE 6 | Appraisal of norm violation as a function of country and emotion expression in the last picture.
to the norm violation, followed by sadness while least accuracy
was predicted for neutral expressions. In the present study, this
pattern emerged again for Israel and for Germany but only
for Germany were all three conditions signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other. For Israel, anger led to a better rate of
deducing the norm than did sadness or neutrality. Sadness,
however, was not better than neutrality (see Figure 5). For
Greece there was no diﬀerence in accuracy between anger and
sadness, whereas for the US there was no diﬀerence between
sadness and neutrality. This pattern largely matches the pattern of
anger perception reported above. We therefore assessed whether
accuracy was mediated through anger perception as predicted by
Hypothesis 2.
To assess whether anger perception mediated both norm
learning accuracy and the appraisal of norm violation (H2), we
regressed these variables on the emotion ratings separately for
each emotion expression condition as well as across emotion
expression conditions with age as a covariate (see Table 1). Age
was only signiﬁcant for norm learning, such that older individuals
learned the norms more readily when the individuals in the last
picture showed either sadness or anger. When age was included
as a covariate the beta for the eﬀect of anger ratings on norm
learning improved slightly. There was no eﬀect of age on norm
appraisal.
The same pattern of signiﬁcant eﬀects emerged for all
conditions2 . All models were signiﬁcant for both norm
learning accuracy and the appraisal of norm violation. Norm
learning accuracy was signiﬁcantly positively predicted by
anger rating intensity and negatively by ratings of indiﬀerence
but not by sadness ratings. The appraisal of norm violation
was also positively predicted by anger intensity ratings and
negatively by indiﬀerence ratings but also positively by sadness
ratings.
2In one exception, indiﬀerence ratings did not signiﬁcantly predict the appraisal of
norm violation in the neutral emotion expression condition.
Together, these ﬁndings suggest that anger is a strong social
signal of norm violation even for expressions that do not
include anger as the focal emotion. Ratings of indiﬀerence
are indicative of a perception of a lack of emotionality of
the group. According to appraisal theories of emotion (e.g.,
Scherer, 1987), emotions are only elicited by events that
are relevant to the emoter. Hence, when the group seemed
indiﬀerent, participants were more likely to conclude that
nothing noteworthy had happened, which explains why these
ratings are negatively related to perceptions of norm violation
and norm learning accuracy. Interestingly, sadness intensity
ratings only signiﬁcantly predicted the appraisal of norm
violation but not norm learning accuracy. This is supportive of
the notion that an appraisal of goal obstruction/ unpleasantness
as indexed by sadness is a sign that something is wrong, but is less
indicative of what exactly is wrong.
Does Taking a First Person Perspective
Increase Norm Learning and Appraisals of
Norm Violation?
A signiﬁcant main eﬀect of perspective, F(1,1078) = 6.43,
p = 0.011, η2p = 0.01, emerged for norm learning, such that
across conditions and countries, participants’ descriptions
were more accurate when the ﬁrst person perspective was
adopted (M = 0.34, SE = 0.02), then when the third
person perspective was used (M = 0.27, SE = 0.02),
conﬁrming the notion that personal relevance increases
norm learning. As for norm learning, a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of perspective emerged for norm violation appraisals
as well, F(1,1097) = 6.90, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.01. Speciﬁcally,
participants considered it more likely that a norm violation
had occurred when they adopted a ﬁrst person perspective
(M = 3.34, SE = 0.08 vs. M = 2.92, SE = 0.09) suggesting
that personal relevance also increases the awareness of a norm
violation. Together these ﬁndings suggest that participants paid
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TABLE 1 | Significance levels and βs as a function for last picture emotion expression as a function of expression condition.
β
F p r2 Anger Sadness Neutrality Age
Overall
Norm learning accuracy 41.97 0.001 0.13 0.35∗∗∗ −0.04 (ns) −0.06∗ 0.09∗∗∗
Appraisal of norm violation 295.21 0.001 0.51 0.56∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.04t
Anger in last picture
Norm learning accuracy 20.10 0.001 0.18 0.36∗∗∗ 0.01 (ns) −0.13∗ 0.11∗
Appraisal of norm violation 85.45 0.001 0.48 0.59∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.03 (ns)
Sadness in last picture
Norm learning accuracy 16.95 0.001 0.16 0.35∗∗∗ 0.04 (ns) −0.15∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
Appraisal of norm violation 95.57 0.001 0.51 0.52∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.05 (ns)
Neutrality in last picture
Norm learning accuracy 3.11 0.016 0.03 0.19∗ 0.02 (ns) 0.08 (ns) 0.03 (ns)
Appraisal of norm violation 65.65 0.001 0.42 0.39∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ −0.07 (ns) −0.05(ns)
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
more attention when the task was made personally relevant to
them (H4).
Does the Salience of the Hand Position Impact
on Norm Learning and Appraisals of Norm
Violation?
We had predicted that the norm violation would be more
salient when the norm describes a hand position that varies
from the culturally normative hand position. This, because
culturally normative behavior is generally unremarkable (Miller
and Prentice, 1996). Given that the situation has a certain level
of complexity, it is more likely that the culturally “deviant”
hand position would be salient to the observer and hence the
switch to the other hand position would be more noticeable.
As such, participants should be better at using simple statistical
information when the normative behavior deviates from the
cultural norm of drinking tea from a cup held one-handedly
rather than two-handedly. In fact, participants were overall better
at learning the norm when the norm was to hold the cup
with both hands (M = 0.40, SE = 0.20) rather than one hand
(M = 0.21, SE = 0.02). As expected, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
as a function of normative hand position emerged for the anger
expression condition, t(373) = 1.77, p = 0.078, d = 0.18. By
contrast, for both the sadness, t(375) = 6.84, p< 0.001, d = 0.71,
and neutral conditions, t(372) = 3.66, p < 0.001, d = 0.38,
participants were better when the norm involved both hands
(see Figure 7), thus, for the two conditions in which participants
were overall less accurate, the cultural normativeness of the hand
position made a diﬀerence, however, this diﬀerence was larger
for sadness than for neutrality. For appraisals of norm violation,
by contrast, the main eﬀect of normative hand position was not
signiﬁcant, F(1,1097) = 1.57, p = 0.211, η2p = 0.00, suggesting
that the salience of the hand position did not tip participants
oﬀ as to whether a norm violation had occurred. In sum, the
culturally normative hand position was most eﬀective as a cue
when participants were trying to understand the exact norm and
onlookers did not show anger.
General Discussion
The present study was conducted to assess the role of emotion
expressions as social signals of norm violation in a cross-cultural
context. Because anger expressions are based on an appraisal of
norm violation, we had predicted that anger is a powerful signal
of norm violation (H2). Yet, cross-cultural research suggests
that the perception of anger varies with cultural norms and
decoding rules (e.g., Grandey et al., 2010; Koopmann-Holm and
Matsumoto, 2011; Hess and Hareli, 2014). More recent research
also suggests that emotions may vary in their social-relational
meaning between independent and interdependent cultures
(Kafetsios et al., under review). These considerations allow for
the possibility that the social signal value of anger expressions
varies with culture. This can be either as a function of cultural
diﬀerences in emotion perception, based on display/decoding
rules, or as a function of a diﬀerential use of emotions in
diﬀerent cultures. The present research provides evidence for
both notions.
First, even though across the four cultures clear evidence for
the universality of emotion perception emerged, in that anger
expressions were rated as most angry, sadness expressions as
most sad, and neutral expression as most indiﬀerent, there were
nonetheless substantial between-culture diﬀerences in emotion
ratings (H1). In particular, German participants were especially
prone to perceive anger, whereas Greek participants were more
likely to perceive sadness, replicating observations by Hess et al.
(in press). Also, participants from the US were more likely to
perceive the expressers as indiﬀerent. These ﬁndings suggest
that members of diﬀerent cultures are diﬀerentially sensitive to
speciﬁc emotions. At the same time, Israeli participants overall
diﬀerentiated best between the three types of expressions, which
may reﬂect an in-group advantage (Elfenbein et al., 2007) as the
expressions were created in Israel.
Importantly, and as expected, these cultural diﬀerences in
emotion perception predicted cultural diﬀerences in norm
learning accuracy and appraisals of norm violation (H2).
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FIGURE 7 | Norm learning as a function of hand position and emotion expression in the last picture.
Speciﬁcally, across all emotion expression conditions, ratings of
anger were positive and ratings of indiﬀerence were negative
predictors of both norm learning accuracy and appraisals of norm
violation. That is, independent of whether the expressions were
angry, sad, or neutral, participants were more likely to learn
the norm and perceive the norm violation, to the degree that
they considered the expression as showing anger. As such, anger
was found to be a potent signal of norm violation not only
when shown as a focal emotion, but also to the degree that it
was detected within other emotion expressions. Consequently, in
cultures in which social norms are more lenient with regard to the
expression of anger (Germany and Israel) participants were more
likely to describe a norm accurately and appraise the situation as
likely to involve a norm violation, when the group reacted with
anger to the norm violation.
Appraisals of norm violation, but not norm learning, were also
predicted by ratings of sadness, however, the eﬀect was notably
weaker. This suggests that an expression linked to an appraisal
of goal obstruction/unpleasantness, which signals that something
undesirable has happened can, in the right context, be a signal of
norm violation as well, yet a less powerful one. Notably, Greek
participants, who perceived anger to a lesser degree and sadness
to a higher degree thanmembers of the other cultures, were better
at using sadness as a sign of a likely norm violation, but not for
norm learning. As such, they were aware that a norm was violated
but not why. US participants by contrast seemed to be better able
to use statistical information for norm learning.
Two additional factors had been varied, normative hand
position and the perspective that the participants were asked
to assume. Even though the eﬀect of hand position did not
reach statistical signiﬁcance in the study by Hareli et al. (2013),
the pattern of means was suggestive of such an eﬀect. In fact,
common sense suggests that a behavior that violates a cultural
norm (such as the polite way of holding a teacup) is more salient
than a behavior that conforms to the norm, which in fact may be
invisible to the casual observer (Miller and Prentice, 1996). Thus,
it may be expected that group norm eﬀects interact with cultural
norms, such that a group norm that conﬂicts with the cultural
expectations for proper behavior is more readily apparent and
learned more easily. This was indeed the case but notably only
for behaviors that were reacted to with sadness or neutrality.
That is, when a behavior was reacted to with anger, participants
were not advantaged by the additional salience of the behavior.
This suggests that seeing anger is a suﬃciently clear signal that
observers are able to recreate the scene in their mind to a degree
that allows them to describe the group norm even when it is
not salient. Interestingly, the salience of the behavior was most
eﬀective for expressions reacted to with sadness. As sadness
signals that something is wrong, salience may be what is needed
to ﬁgure out what it is that is wrong. This role of salience is also
supported by the fact that emotion expression and hand position
combine to aﬀect norm learning but not the appraisal of norm
violation, which can be made based on the emotion expression
information alone.
Finally, we also varied whether participants adopted a ﬁrst or
a third person perspective when describing the norm. For both
norm learning and the appraisal of norm violation, a main eﬀect
of perspective emerged. As no interaction eﬀects were found, this
seems to simply suggest that participants paid more attention
when the task was made more personally relevant by adopting a
ﬁrst person perspective. This suggests that apart from the factors
noted above, motivation is also a signiﬁcant factor in norm
understanding (H4).
This factor also seems to play a role in understanding why
German participants were especially good, across conditions,
at norm learning. This diﬀerence cannot be explained by
emotion rating tendencies alone as these were not very diﬀerent
between Israel and Germany. However, it has been suggested
and demonstrated that members of diﬀerent cultures are in
fact diﬀerentially sensitive to norms. Gelfand et al. (2011)
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distinguishes between “tight” cultures, which have strong norms
and a low tolerance for deviant behavior and “loose” cultures,
which have weak norms and a high tolerance for deviant
behavior. The expectation is that members of tighter cultures
should be more concerned about behaving according to norms
and more concerned about social sanctioning because of the
lower tolerance by tight cultures for deviance (Gelfand et al.,
2006). As Germany is higher in cultural tightness than the other
three countries in our study (Gelfand et al., 2011), it is thus likely
that German participants were especially sensitive to the norm
violation as well as more motivated to learn the correct norm.
The study had some limitations. Notably, the samples varied
somewhat in age and gender composition. However, when
gender was used as a covariate it was not signiﬁcant. Even
though gender diﬀerences in emotion recognition accuracy are
frequently reported, they are not always found. In fact, research
in this domain has also pointed to strong motivational eﬀects
as underlying the observed gender diﬀerences in recognition
accuracy (Ickes et al., 2000). As only one image had to be rated,
it may well be that gender was less inﬂuential. By contrast, age
was found to inﬂuence emotion perception for anger such that
older participants tended to rate all images as less angry. The
eﬀect was rather weak, but is noteworthy as only 1% of the
participants was over 60 and hence the age of our participants
was within a range where diﬀerences in emotion perception
accuracy have not been previously reported. However, the task
here regards the sensitivity to anger, that is, the intensity with
which anger was perceived and not the question of whether anger
was mislabelled, which is the focus of most emotion recognition
studies. Nonetheless, when age was included as a covariate, the
eﬀect of anger on norm learning was slightly higher and no eﬀect
on norm appraisal was found.
Participants in the present study were asked to assume to
want to join the group. It is interesting to speculate on the eﬀect
of anger expressions by group members in reaction to a norm
violation on that motivation. Thus, Heerdink et al. (2013) found
that group members whose opinions deviated from a group felt
rejected when the group reacted with anger. This ﬁnding suggests
that even though anger expressions are helpful in facilitating
people’s integration into a group by allowing them to learn the
relevant group norms, they may do so at a cost. This is a question
for future research.
In sum, the present study showed that across cultures anger
is a potent signal for norm violation. However, whether this
signal is used to its full extent depends on the observers’
culturally determined sensitivity to anger expressions and the
culturally determined use of such expressions. In this sense,
the present research demonstrates both cultural universality and
cultural diﬀerences. Thus, in the terms of Norenzayan and
Heine (2005) the use of anger as a signal of norm violation is
a functional universal, in that anger perception is a cognitive
tool found in all cultures that serves the same function in all
cultures, but is used to diﬀerent degrees in diﬀerent cultures. In
this vein, the present research also underlines the importance
of considering both universality and cultural variation when
studying emotions. The strong impact of social norms and values
on the perception of emotion is congruent with appraisal theory
of emotion, which sees emotions determined by such rules and
norms. It is therefore only logical that their perception is also
inﬂuenced by such rules and norms. Focussing exclusively on
universality ignores this basic fact but focusing exclusively on
cultural variation ignores the existence of basic cognitive tools
that all humans dispose of – but simply may use to diﬀerent
extends.
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